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Abstract 
 
Having a professional sport team in the top divisions has a potential 
economic impact in its geographical area. In this paper we analyse the 
effect of having a professional football team of the Spanish First or 
Second Division in a certain province on the amount of sales of football 
pools in Spain (La Quiniela).  
To carry out the empirical exercise we estimate a demand equation 
using a panel data set at provincial level for the years 1985-2005, 
merging the traditional economic models in the lotto demand literature: 
the effective price model and the jackpot model. 
Our results show that having a club in the top divisions has a 
significant effect on sales of La Quiniela. Moreover, previous results 
using fixture (round) data are confirmed in this paper. We also provide 
evidence showing La Quiniela bets to be a normal good and, as an 
implicit tax, regressive. 
 
Keywords: football pools, lotto, effective price, jackpot 
JEL classification: D12, D80, L83 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of the importance of the economic impact of a professional 
sports team on a geographical area has been extensively analysed in the 
empirical sports economics literature. No definite conclusion about the 
importance of this effect has been reached, and in some cases the effect 
is estimated to be negative. Most of these studies focus their attention 
on the effect of the main activity of the club (playing games) but far less 
attention has been given to the extent to which the sports gambling 
industry of a particular geographical area can be affected by the 
presence of a professional team in the top division. Thus even though 
the relation between sport consumption and sport gambling has also 
been discussed in the literature1 - gambling is expected to be a 
complementary good with many sports -, the empirical evidence is 
limited. In this paper we analyse the effect on sales of football pools (La 
Quiniela) in a particular geographical area in Spain (a province) of 
having a professional football team.  
The appearance of La Quiniela in the 1946-47 season was a milestone 
in the history of gambling in Spain, as until then the Loteria Nacional2 
was the only available lottery-type game. La Quiniela is a government-
operated pari-mutuel game in which prizes are a percentage of the total 
revenue and in which players have to choose the final results for a list 
of football matches among three alternatives: home win (1), draw (X), 
and away win (2). The share of revenues not distributed as prizes could 
be interpreted as an implicit tax on Spanish football pools’ players. 
To measure the effect of having a professional football club in the top 
division on sales of La Quiniela we estimate a demand equation based 
on the same economic framework of the empirical models in the lotto 
demand literature3, as has been done by García and Rodríguez (2007) in 
                                              
1 Forrest and Simmons (2003) review the relationship between gambling and sport. 
2 Beginning in 1812, the Loteria Nacional is a very famous lottery game with weekly 
draws in Spain. 
3 A review of this literature can be found in Clotfelter and Cook (1990), Walker (1998) 
and Forrest (2003). 
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a previous paper about La Quiniela in Spain. In this framework the 
economic variables considered to explain football pools sales are the 
effective price and the jackpot (the maximum prize). 
Using annual data at a provincial level, we also control for the effect of 
other variables, such as income, population, the composition of the 
coupon4 and the number of football teams in the top divisions. The 
empirical results reinforce previous findings by García and Rodríguez 
(2007) in terms of the relevance of the composition of the coupon and 
the joint significance of the two economic variables we mentioned above. 
We also find a significant effect of the presence of a football club in 
either the First or Second Division of the Spanish football league on 
sales of La Quiniela and we identify the bets in this game as a normal 
good bringing some evidence of La Quiniela, as an implicit tax, being 
regressive. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
structure of the game La Quiniela and its evolution over recent years. In 
Section 3 we present the economic framework for the demand equations 
we specify. The variables used in the empirical analysis are described in 
Section 4. The estimation methods and the main empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5. We finish with a summary of the more relevant 
conclusions. 
 
2. Football pools in Spain  
La Quiniela is managed by a public institution, Loterias y Apuestas del 
Estado (LAE), which also manages most of the lotteries in Spain. For 
several years La Quiniela, together with the Loteria Nacional and the 
Organizacion Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE) lottery (a daily draw) 
were the only legal betting games available in Spain. Ever since 1985, 
La Quiniela has been competing with another lotto game, La Primitiva, 
and all the new games launched by LAE with a similar structure. 
                                              
4 Football pools’ promoters use this name when referring to the paper grids which 
gamblers fill in to bet on the results of football matches. 
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The exceptional importance of the football pools industry in Spain lies 
in the scope of its economic and social benefits. In the beginning, 
Spanish charity organizations were the main institutions favoured by 
the funds obtained through sport betting. Later, these benefits were 
distributed to other institutions. During the 1950´s, sports 
organizations began to receive a share of total revenue and in the 
1980´s the claims of professional football teams were considered. Also, 
special events like the Football World Cup in 1982 or the Olympic 
Games in Barcelona in 1992 benefitted from football pools, as did the 
ADO (the Spanish Olympic Sports Association) program. Generally 
speaking, the funds obtained have the objective of promoting sports 
activities. The Spanish Royal Decree of February 20, 1998, established 
the current distribution of La Quiniela revenues. The Spanish 
Professional Football League (LFP) receives 10% (in 2005 this amounted 
to approximately €50 million),  the National Council of Sports gets 1%, 
and 10.98% goes to the provincial governments in order to promote 
social activities and sport facilities. The Public Exchequer takes in 23% 
of total revenues, once the administration and distribution expenses 
have been discounted.      
Although La Quiniela shares some characteristics with lotto games in 
that both are pari-mutuel games, it is not a lottery in the sense that the 
winning combination is not the outcome of a draw but is instead related 
to the final results of several football matches. To win the maximum 
prize players must correctly guess the results of all 14 matches 
included in the coupon. It has been this way since the beginning of La 
Quiniela with exception of the period between the beginning of the 
1988-89 season and the end of the 2002-03 season when 15 instead of 
14 matches were included in the coupons. This extra match (El pleno al 
15) to win the maximum prize was introduced again in the 2005-06 
season. Up to the 1988-89 season, bettors that succeeded in correctly 
picking 14, 13 and 12 results won prizes. In addition, if there were no 
winners of the maximum prize, those picking 11 correct results also 
won a prize. Since then, if there are no winners of the first prize, the 
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quantity of this prize rolls over, and since the 1991-92 season those 
who get 11 results correct have won a prize. A lower prize for players 
just picking 10 correctly was also introduced in the 2003-04 season. 
The distribution of revenues devoted to prizes (about the 55% of total 
revenues) among categories has changed over time. In 2005, 12% was 
assigned to those guessing correctly 14 results, 10% was for those that 
in addition got El Pleno al 15, and 24% was shared out equally among 
those who guessed correctly 13, 12 and 11. Finally, 9% went to those 
who got 10 results right. 
Nowadays, according to LAE information the sales revenue of La 
Quiniela is about €500 million, slightly less than 2% of the total amount 
of gambling revenues in Spain. However, the evolution of the bets 
played in La Quiniela has shown a considerable variability over time. 
Figure 1 shows the number of coupons sold since the 1970-71 season. 
We can observe substantial variability in football pools spending, with 
bets ranging from 5,000 million in the 1979-80 season to 749 million in 
the 1989-1990 season. Although part of this variability can be 
explained by changes in the nominal price the large fall in sales, close 
to 80%, between the year 1985 and 1990 can largely be explained by 
the appearance of La Primitiva on the Spanish gambling market5.  
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    FIGURE 1: Number of coupons 
                                              
5 This also happened in the case of British football pools (Forrest, 1999). 
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With regards to the price, in 1970 the price of a La Quiniela bet was 
€0.03, whereas since the 2003-04 season the price has been €0.50. 
Between these two dates the real price has been characterized by a 
negative trend, but the last change introduced in the 2003-04 season, 
where the price increased by 66% (from €0.3 to €0.5), inverted this 
trend6.  
With respect to the provincial variability of La Quiniela, Figure 2 plots 
the average number of coupons per fixture per capita in each province 
(including autonomous cities) during the 1985-2005 period. The overall 
average is 0.88, with two provinces (Balearic Islands and the 
autonomous city of Ceuta) having a particularly high average (well 
above 1.5). This probably corresponds to the influence of some outliers 
due to the effect of sales corresponding to bets made by large groups of 
bettors (peñas).  
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FIGURE 2: Number of coupons sold by province 
 
                                              
6 A detailed analysis of the evolution of price, as well as other variables related to La 
Quiniela can be found in García and Rodríguez (2007). 
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The evidence from Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the dependent 
variable in our empirical model (the number of coupons sold) has 
enough variability in both dimensions to allow us to distinguish 
between temporal and geographical effects. 
 
3. Economic background 
As we have mentioned, in this article we consider a model which nests 
both economic models proposed in the empirical literature on the 
demand for lotto. The effective price model, based on expected utility 
theory, has been the most frequently used in this type of analysis7. 
Within this theoretical framework the lottery tickets or coupons are 
considered to be financial assets with risk and the prizes are considered 
as the returns to a certain investment (the price of a bet). The effective 
price of a bet is then defined as the difference between the nominal 
value and the expected prize. 
Consider the simple case where there is only one prize and where we 
assume a unit price for each bet to simplify the presentation. Following 
Cook and Clotfelter (1993) the expected value (EV) of a bet is the 
amount of the prize adjusted by the probability of having a winning 
ticket and divided by the expected number of winners. Farrell et al. 
(1999) reinterpret this expected prize as the value of the total amount of 
prizes (the maximum prize or the jackpot (J) in this case) multiplied by 
the probability of having at least one winning ticket (1-P) and divided by 
the total number of tickets sold (A), i.e., 
   EV = (1 - P) J/A     (1) 
with the jackpot defined as  
    J = B + (1 - τ) A     (2) 
                                              
7 Empirical applications of the effective price model appear in Cook and Clotfelter 
(1993), Gulley and Scott (1993), Scott and Gulley (1995), Walker (1998), Farrell et al 
(1999), Forrest et al (2000) and García and Rodríguez (2007). 
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where B is the rollover from a previous fixture without winners, τ is the 
take-out rate (the share of the revenues that is not distributed as prizes) 
and P is the probability of not having a winner ticket. 
La Quiniela is a peculiar game in which the results of the matches are 
not usually chosen in a random way given that the bet has to do with 
the results of a set of football matches. Thus, the composition of the 
coupons is relevant, meaning that each bet has different winning 
probabilities. The probability of having a winning ticket (π) is therefore 
not known exactly ex ante, depending instead on the forecast (1, X, or 2) 
chosen for each match included in the coupon. Additionally, there is the 
issue of conscious selection which is probably more important than in 
lotto games (Farrell et al, 2000). Given that there are no data available 
for these ex ante probabilities, we will assume that they are the same 
for all tickets and we will disregard the problem of conscious selection. 
Consequently, the probability of not having a winning ticket (P) is: 
  P = (1 - π)A       (3) 
Notice that P decreases with both the number of tickets sold (A) and the 
difficulty of the game (π). Also, according to the definition of the jackpot 
in expression (2) the expected prize increases with the amount of the 
rollover and decreases with the take-out rate. An increase of sales will 
have two effects: on the one hand, the prize will increase with sales, but 
on the other hand, the expected number of winners also increases, 
dominating the first effect. The difficulty of the game has a negative 
effect on the expected prize. 
As mentioned by Forrest et al (2002), the main limitation of the effective 
price model is that in the case of having several prizes a change in the 
structure of prizes could not generate a change in the effective price and 
therefore could not cause a change in demand8. Forrest et al (2002) 
specify an alternative model where the jackpot is the main economic 
variable on the demand for lotto. This model is based on a previous idea 
                                              
8 Empirical evidence for the lotto in the UK seems to contradict this (Forrest et al, 
2002) 
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by Clotfelter and Cook (1989) who consider that bettors are buying a 
hope (or a dream) each time they buy a ticket and that hope has to do 
with the amount of the jackpot. Rather than the effective price they 
propose using the amount of the top prize as the main economic 
variable affecting sales. 
As the effective price model and the jackpot model have different 
implications in terms of policy changes in the structure of prizes, we 
will consider, as in García and Rodríguez (2007), the specification of a 
model including both variables (the effective price and the jackpot), 
whose identification is discussed in the section of empirical results.  
 
4. The determinants of sales of La Quiniela  
To carry out the empirical exercise we use an annual panel data set for 
all the Spanish provinces (52 in total, including the two autonomous 
cities) for the period from 1985 to 2005 in order to identify the 
determinants of the average number of bets per fixture per capita for La 
Quiniela. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation of 
the demand equations are reported in Table 1.  
In Table 2 we report the amount of the face value (FV) – the price of a 
bet - and the definition of the effective price (EP) and the jackpot (J) for 
each fixture in the sample period we consider. Notice that the rollover 
(B), introduced in the 1988-89 season, is taken into account in the 
definitions of these variables9. As mentioned in the previous section, to 
calculate the expected prizes we have to weight prizes by the probability 
of having at least one winner of each prize (1-P). Given that La Quiniela 
is not a draw and given the presence of conscious selection processes, 
we approximate this probability by the proportion of fixtures with 
winners of a particular prize (P14 and P15 for the prize of 14 and 15 
correct guesses, respectively)  for the whole sample period (0.928647 
and 0.7953529, respectively). Since the 1991-92 season, when the 
                                              
9 Given that we are dealing with annual data, we use the average yearly value per 
fixture of EP, J and B in the estimation procedure. 
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amount of the prize corresponding to 11 correct guesses is below a 
certain quantity, winners of this prize do not receive the amount and 
the total corresponding to this pool is rolled over. In this way we 
approximate the probability of the prize for 11 correct guesses not 
rolling over (P11) by the proportion of fixtures with prize for those 
correctly guessing 11 results (0.964045). The same was applied to the 
prize for those who guess 10 correctly in the 2005-06 season, so we 
approximate the probability that the amount for this prize does not roll 
over, P10, in the same way as we did for P11  (0.968254). Furthermore, 
during the 1986-87 and 1987-88 seasons a new prize for those correctly 
guessing all the results at half time was introduced. This new prize 
reduced the amount devoted to prizes for the correct guess of the end-
of-match results, except in the case where there were no winners of this 
new prize. We approximate this probability (PnoHT) in a similar way as we 
did for the other probabilities.  
To control for the impact of the presence of a professional football team 
in a province on the volume of sales of La Quiniela in that province we 
define a variable which captures the number of teams in the First 
Division and another one for teams in the Second Division. Given the 
Spanish professional football league promotion and relegation system 
the number of teams in the top divisions in a province varies across 
provinces and throughout time. As we use yearly data whereas the 
football pools season in Spain starts in August and ends in June or 
July the following year, it is possible for a team to be in a certain 
division for only half a year. Thus, we can consider that there are two 
“mid-seasons” in every year. This way, the variable that controls for the 
presence of First Division teams in each province takes the value zero if 
a province does not have a team in this division the whole year and 0.5 
for each “mid-season” and team in the First Division. The same values 
are used in the case of the variable that controls for the number of 
Second Division teams. 
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In order to capture the geographical effects in the demand for football 
pools, we include the provincial household gross income per capita, as 
well as that of the population, in the estimations to control their 
possible effects on sales of La Quiniela. Also, following García and 
Rodríguez (2007), we consider the relevance of controlling for the 
number of fixtures in which First Division teams are not included in the 
coupon to account for the importance of the illusion of control in La 
Quiniela, where bettors use their knowledge on Spanish football teams 
to try to correctly guess the results of the matches included in the bet.  
Finally, we consider the potential impact of unobserved individual 
(provincial) effects in the models to capture other features of the 
geographical distribution of the demand for La Quniela apart from 
income and the population. We do this by including provincial dummies 
in the demand equation, which is equivalent to using the within-group 
estimator. It should be pointed out that although the within-group 
estimator of a dynamic linear model with panel data is inconsistent in 
the case where the number of time periods is short (Nickell, 1981), we 
rely on asymptotic results for both individuals and time periods tending 
towards infinity, which imply that as the number of time periods 
increases, the bias tends to zero. In particular, the asymptotic bias 
becomes very small (not relevant in relative terms) when the number of 
time periods is around 20, as in our case (we have 21 periods), 
according to the expression of the asymptotic bias for a simple 
autoregressive model (Nickell, 1981). 
 
5. Empirical results 
Given that the dependent variable (number of coupons per fixture and 
per capita) is included in the definition of both economic explanatory 
variables (the effective price and the jackpot) we estimate the model by 
instrumental variables. We use the amount of the rollover, its square, 
and the number of rollovers as instruments. Moreover, we also consider 
the number of fixtures throughout the year to instrument both variables 
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(the effective price and the jackpot). All of these are clearly exogenous 
variables because they have been previously determined. As proposed in 
Garcia and Rodriguez (2007), the use of a polynomial of order two of the 
instruments ensures the matrix of instruments to be of a sufficient rank 
to obtain consistent estimates, as well as allowing us to simultaneously 
include both variables (the effective price and the jackpot) in the model 
and estimate their effect consistently10. 
Following the empirical literature on lotto demand we also consider, as 
in Forrest et al. (2002), two versions of the model differing in terms of 
the economic variables which are included in the specification. In one of 
them we use the effective price as the main economic determinant of 
sales, while in the other we include the amount of the jackpot. The 
estimation results of these models are reported in Appendix A.    
Additionally, Walker (1998) suggests that in the case of lottery there are 
reasons (addiction, inertia or habit) to expect sales in one period to be 
correlated with sales in the next one. We consider dynamic versions of 
the model by adding lags of the dependent variable allowing us to get 
both short and long run conclusions. 
In Table 3 we report the results of the estimation of the model including 
two lags of the dependent variable, whose coefficients are allowed to be 
different for each province11. The unobserved geographical effects are 
controlled by including dummies for each province12. 
According to the results the coefficients of the economic variables have 
the expected sign: negative for the effective price and positive for the 
jackpot. It is important to point out that both coefficients are 
significant, which means that this specification is preferred to the other 
specifications considered in the literature, where only one economic 
variable is included (see Appendix A). As found in García and Rodríguez 
                                              
10 Following Kelejian (1971), the nonlinearity in variables (but linearity in parameters) 
of the model allows us to use polynomials of the original instruments and the 
predetermined variables to form the final set of instruments.  
11 We test these coefficients to be equal and non-significant and reject both null 
hypotheses. 
12 The estimates of all the coefficients of these variables are available on request. 
 13 
(2007) using fixture data, the goodness of fit measures are better when 
eliminating the effective price variable compared to what happens when 
eliminating the jackpot variable. 
In Table 4 we report the estimated elasticities (short and long run) for 
the effective price and the jackpot13. Since we allowed for a different 
dynamic structure for each province, the long run elasticities have 
geographical variation, which is significant. The effective price elasticity 
varies from –0.571 to –1.275 with an average close (and not significantly 
different) to –1, implying that LAE behaves in a revenue–maximizing 
way. The long run jackpot elasticity is also significant, varying from 
0.452 to 1.008 with an average of 0.714, implying that changes in the 
jackpot have substantial effects on sales. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the main objective of the paper is to 
evaluate to what extent having a club in the top division has an 
influence on the amount of coupons of La Quiniela sold in the 
corresponding province. The evidence in Table 3, shows that having a 
team in the province competing in the First Division increases the sales 
per capita of La Quiniela by approximately 4.5% in the short run and 
10.8% in the long run. This means that in terms of revenue from La 
Quiniela for LAE, it is more profitable to have teams in the top division 
in those provinces with a large population suggesting a relation of 
complementarity between household consumption of football and 
betting on football, as it is proposed in Forrest and Simmons (2003). 
This positive effect is also found when we consider teams in the Second 
Division. In that case the increase in sales is slightly above 2% but it is 
only significant at the 10% level. In any case, the difference between the 
coefficients of the variables capturing the number of teams in a 
particular division is significant and the effect is more important for the 
number of teams in the First Division. Betting on football appears to be 
                                              
13 Given the functional form chosen for the demand equation the estimated coefficient 
of the economic variables in logs could be interpreted as short run elasticities. Long 
run elasticities are calculated by dividing these coefficients by 1 minus the sum of the 
lagged coefficients of the dependent variable. 
 
 14 
more exciting when locals can also bet on the local team. The coupon is 
more attractive for an individual when it includes games (in general, 
First and Second Division games) which are played by teams which are 
geographically close to that individual. 
A more general aspect of the composition of the coupon has to do with 
whether games of First Division clubs are included or not. Since we are 
dealing with annual data we proxy this variable by the number of 
fixtures without these clubs obtaining a highly significant negative 
effect, i.e. the presence of First Division teams in La Quiniela increases 
the number of bets14. 
Given that we have panel data of provinces we considered some socio-
economic variables to capture the geographical dimension. Gross 
household income per capita and population are the variables included, 
both having geographical and time variability. The results show a 
positive and significant effect for the income variable though with an 
elasticity (both short and long run) clearly below one, i.e. La Quiniela is 
a normal good, although the demand is not very sensitive to changes in 
income. The estimated income elasticities show, as in Clotfelter and 
Cook (1990), that per capita sales increase less than proportionately 
with income which makes La Quiniela, as an implicit tax, regressive. 
Finally, with respect to the population variable we obtain a negative 
effect, meaning that provinces with a large population have smaller 
sales per capita of La Quiniela. This could reflect a larger supply of 
alternative leisure activities (substitutes for La Quiniela and gambling in 
general) in highly-populated provinces. It should be pointed out that 
this effect becomes significant if we do not include the set of dummies 
for the provinces. Thus, part of the geographical variability of the 
population is captured by these dummies, although the sign of the 
coefficient is not affected.  This is also the case for the effect of the 
income variable, which also has a large geographical variability. We 
                                              
14 This result goes in the same direction as that in García and Rodríguez (2007) using 
fixture data. 
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reject the null hypothesis of the non-significance of the coefficients of 
the provincial dummies (p-value = 0.000). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we estimated a dynamic panel data model in order to 
measure the impact of having a football team in the top divisions (First 
and Second Division) on Spanish football pools (La Quiniela) sales at a 
provincial level. We also analysed the main economic determinants of 
the demand for football pools in Spain controlling for geographical 
effects given the nature of the data we use. We considered a model in 
which both usual economic variables – the effective price and the 
jackpot - are simultaneously included in the demand equation for La 
Quiniela. The model is estimated by instrumental variables. 
Evidence on the complementary character of the relation between 
Spanish football consumption and betting on Spanish football is shown. 
The empirical findings are robust enough to conclude that, in the long 
run, having a football team in the top divisions causes a significant 
impact on sales of football pools in a province. In particular, having a 
team in the First Division implies a long run increase in La Quiniela 
sales of approximately 10.8%. 
On the other hand, the composition of the coupon also appears as an 
important determinant of sales, since not including First Division teams 
in the coupon implies a reduction in sales of 4.7% in the long run. This 
has to do with the active role of bettors in La Quiniela in that they use 
their knowledge on football teams to try to guess the results of the 
matches included in the coupon. 
Finally, we identify a significant effect for some socio-economic variables 
referred to the province. In particular, we find La Quiniela bets to be a 
normal good and regressive as we estimate a positive (less than one) 
and significant income elasticity.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of coupons per capita and per fixture 0.882 0.496 
Effective price (€) 0.129 0.030 
Jackpot (thousands €) 2555 8865 
Gross household income per capita (thousands €) 9.989 2.362 
Population (thousands) 775 947 
Number of football clubs in the First Division 0.384 0.612 
Number of football clubs in the Second Division 0.398 0.593 
Number of fixtures without First Division teams 4.286 2.354 
Note: All economic variables are in real terms (base year 2001).  
 
 
Table 2. Definition of the Face Value, the Jackpot and the Effective 
Price 
Season 
Face 
Value 
(FV) 
Jackpot (J) Effective Price (EP) 
1985-86 € 0.09 J=(0.50325/3)R EP=FV-0.50325 FV 
1986-87 
1987-88 
€ 0.12 J=(0.44/3)R+PnoHT0.063R  
1988-89  J=0.25R+B EP=FV-[(0.3R+P14*0.15R+P15(0.1R+B))/A] 
1989-90 
1990-91 
€ 0.18   
1991-92 
to 
1993-94 
  EP=FV-[(P11*0.1R+0.2R+P14*0.15R+P15*(0.1R+B))/A] 
1994-95 
to 
1997-98 
€ 0.24   
1998-99 
to 
2002-03 
€ 0.30   
2003-04 
2004-05 
€0.50 J=0.15R+B EP=FV- [(0.4R+P14*(0.15R+B))/A] 
2005-06  J=0.22R+B EP=FV- [P10*0.09R+0.24R+P14*0.12R+P15(0.1R+B))/A] 
Note: R = total revenue (number of bets times the face value); B = the rollover; A = sales. An 
empty cell means no change in the definition of the variable with respect to the previous period. 
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Table 3. Estimation results for the demand equation for La Quiniela  
Dependent variable: Number of coupons per fixture per capita sold (log) 
 
  
 Coefficient p-value 
Effective price (log) -0.378 0.000 
Jackpot (log) 0.299 0.000 
Gross household income per capita  (log) 0.191 0.015 
Population (log) -0.130 0.181 
Number of teams in the First Division 0.044 0.009 
Number of teams in the Second Division 0.021 0.057 
Number of fixtures without First Division teams -0.020 0.000 
Adjusted R2 
Sample size 
0.930 
988 
Note: All the economic variables are in real terms.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated elasticities  
 Effective price Jackpot 
Gross household 
income 
per capita 
Short run - 0.378 0.299 0.191 
 
Long run 
 
- 0.903 
(-0.571; -1.275) 
0.132 
 
0.714 
(0.452; 1.008) 
0.104 
 
0.457 
(0.289; 0.645) 
0.067 
Note: The value for long run elasticities is the average of the elasticities of the provinces. The 
range of the variation of the long run elasticities is shown in parentheses. The standard 
deviation is in italics. 
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Appendix A. Estimation results for the demand equation for La 
Quiniela (Effective price model and Jackpot model) 
Dependent variable: Number of coupons per fixture per capita sold (log) 
 
 Effective price 
model 
Jackpot model 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Effective price (log) -0.527 0.000   
Jackpot (log)   0.348 0.000 
Gross household income per capita  (log) 0.845 0.000 -0.249 0.000 
Population (log) 0.195 0.058 -0.478 0.000 
Number of teams in the First Division 0.030 0.100 0.049 0.004 
Number of teams in the Second Division 0.021 0.089 0.022 0.052 
Number of fixtures without First Division teams -0.053 0.000 -0.015 0.000 
Adjusted R2 
Sample size 
0.915 
988 
0.925 
988 
Note: All the economic variables are in real terms.  
 
